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INTRODUCTION
This document has been prepared as a summary presenta-
tion and overview of the proceedings of the Outer Planet Probe
Technology Workshop held at the NASA Ames Research Center, May
21-23,1974. The Workshop was sponsored by Mr. D. Herman of the
Advanced Programs and Technology Office, NASA Headquarters; and
Mr. B. Padrick of the Advanced Space Projects Office, NASA Ames
Research Center. The General Chairman was Mr. A. Seiff of NASA
and Mr. N. Vojvodich of NASA Ames was the Technical Chairman.
The purposes of the Workshop were:
o Review and summarize the state-of-the-art concerning
mission definitions, probe requirements, systems, subsystems,
and mission-peculiar hardware.
o Explore mission and equipment trade-offs associated
with a Saturn/Uranus baseline configuration and the influence
of Titan and Jupiter options on both mission performance and
cost.
o Identify critically required future R&D activities.
To accomplish these purposes the Workshop was organized
into ten sessions, or panels, covering the broad spectrum of
science and engineering subjects concerned with the planning
and implementation of in-situ measurements at the outer planets
using atmospheric entry probes. Presentations of subject ma-
terial were made by the participants as indicated in the program
(see Section A herein). Following the session presentations,
each panel covened a "splinter" meeting during which the topics,
problems, etc. were discussed in more detail. The eleventh ses-
sion was a summary and roundtable discussion on the concluding
afternoon of the Workshop during which each panel chairman re-
viewed the key points covered during their repsective sessions
and splinter meetings.
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This summary document contains:
Section A: Program, Titles and Authors of Presentations
Section B: The Session I Keynote Address
Section C: The Session XI Summary Roundtable Discussion
Section D: List of Workshop Attendees
The entire proceedings of the Workshop are currently in
draft form undergoing review and editing and will be published
in the very near future. This document and the proceedings have
been prepared by DYNATREND INCORPORATED; Burlington, Mass. under
contract to the NASA Ames Research Center.
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SECTION A
PROGRAM
TITLES AND AUTHORS OF PRESENTATIONS
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PROGRAM
Speaker Subject
SESSION I - KEYNOTE ADDRESS
A. Seiff - NASA Ames Opening remarks and introduction
of Mr. Syvertson
S. Syvertson - NASA Ames Welcome to Ames
N. Vojvodich - NASA Ames Opening remarks and outline of
workshop schedule
D. Herman - NASA Headquarters Keynote address
SESSION II - SCIENCE RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES
I. Rasool, Chairman Introductory remarks
NASA Headquarters
T. Owen - State University New IR Observations of Titan and
of New York Potential of In-situ Atmospheric
Analysis of the Outer Planets
D. Hunten - Kitt Peak Diagnostic Measurements of the
National Observatory Upper Atmosphere
J. Lewis - Massachusetts Compositional Measurements by
Institute of Technology Outer Planet Entry Probes
J. Wolfe - NASA Ames Pioneer 10 Jupiter Atmospheric
Definition Results - A Summary
A. Kliore - Jet Propulsion Presentation of the Results of
Laboratory the Pioneer 10 Occultation
Experiment
J. Moore - Jet Propulsion Uranus Science Planning
Laboratory
K. Ledbetter - Martin-Marietta Impact of Science Objectives and
Corporation Requirements on Probe Mission and
System Design
H. Meyers - McDonnell-Douglas Science Data Gathering
Corporation
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Speaker Subject
SESSION III - MISSION AND SPACECRAFT DESIGN CONSTRAINTS
B. Swenson, Chairman Introductory Remarks - Outer
NASA Ames Planet Mission Analysis Overview
L. Friedman - Jet Propulsion Outer Planet Probe Navigation
Laboratory
W. Dixon - TRW Systems Group The Pioneer Spacecraft as a Probe
Carrier
J. Hyde - Jet Propulsion The Mariner Spacecraft as a Probe
Laboratory Carrier
T. Hendricks - Martin-Marietta The Impact of Mission Requirements
Corporation on System Design
C. Hinrichs - McDonnell-Doug- Probe Communications Constraints
las Corporation Imposed by Mission Parameters for
a Typical Jupiter Mission
SESSION IV - PROBE DESIGN AND SYSTEM INTEGRATION
T. Canning, Chairman Introductory Remarks
NASA Ames
T. Ellis - DYNATREND Ten Bar Probe Technical Summary
J. Goodlette - Martin- Viking Lander Design and System
Marietta Corporation Integration
L. Nolte - Hughes Aircraft Pioneer Venus Probe Design
Corporation
E. Casani - Jet Propulsion Probe Interface Design Consider-
Laboratory ations
W. Cowan - McDonnell-Douglas Probe Design
Corporation
P. Carroll - Martin-Marietta Probe Design and System Integra-
Corporation tion
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Speaker Subject
SESSION V - ENTRY AERODYNAMICS AND HEATING
W. Olstad, Chairman Introductory Remarks
NASA Langley
D. Kirk- NASA Ames Effect of Initial Conditions on
Deduced Atmosphere for Uranus and
Jupiter Entries
L. Leibowitz - Jet Propulsion Radiative Relaxation Rates and In-
Laboratory tensities During Outer Planet
Entries
T. Kuo - Jet Propulsion Labo- Nonequilibrium Shock-Layer Compu-
ratory tation for Saturn Probes
R. Polutchko - Martin-Marietta Viking Entry Aerodynamics and
Corporation Heating
G. Walberg - NASA Langley Calculation of Downstream Radia-
tive Flow Fields with Massive
Ablation
W. Nicolet - Aerotherm Aerothermal Environment and
Material Response, A Review
SESSION VI - HEAT PROTECTION
P. Nachtsheim, Chairman Introductory Remarks
NASA Ames
S. Mezines - McDonnell-Doug- Carbon Phenolic Heat Shields for
las Corporation Jupiter/Saturn/Uranus Entry
Probes
J. Lundell - NASA Ames A Survey of the Ablation of Graphic
Materials in Severe Heating En-
vironments
W. Congdon - Martin-Marietta Major Uncertainties Influencing
Corporation Entry Probe Heat Shield Design
J. Howe - NASA Ames Performance of Reflecting Silica
Heat Shields During Entry into
Saturn and Uranus
J. Blome - McDonnell-Douglas High Purity Silica Reflective Heat
Corporation Shield Development
H. Stine - NASA Ames Ames Facilities for Simulating
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Speaker Subject
SESSION VII - COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA HANDLING
T. Grant, Chairman Introductory remarks
NASA Ames
R. Compton - Martin-Marietta Microwave Propagation in the
Corporation Atmospheres of the Outer Planets
P. Parsons - Jet Propulsion A Data Link Relay Design
Laboratory
C. Hinrichs - McDonnell-Doug- Digital Receiver Simulation
las Corporation
J. Modestino - Rensselaer Convolutional Code Performance in
Polytechnic Institute Planetary Entry Channels
T. Croft - Stanford University Radio-Frequency Science Consider-
ations
SESSION VIII - SCIENCE INSTRUMENTS
J. Sperans, Chairman Introductory Remarks
NASA Ames
A. Nier - University of Determination of the Composition
Minnesota of Rarefied Neutral Atmospheres
by Mass Spectrometers Carried on
High-Speed Spacecraft
N. Spencer - NASA Goddard A Mass Spectrometer Concept for
Identifying Planetary Atmosphere
Composition
J. Hoffman - University of Mass Spectrometric Measurements
Texas of Atmospheric Composition
S. Sommer - NASA Ames Comparative Atmosphere Struc-
ture Experiment
W. Kessler - McDonnell-Doug- Impact of the Retained Heat Shield
las Corporation Concept on Science Instruments
B. Ragent - NASA Ames Cloud-Detecting Nephelometer for
Pioneer Venus Probes
V. Oyama - NASA Ames An Application of Gas Chromato-
graphic Analysis to the Atmospheres
of Saturn and Uranus
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Speaker Subject
SESSION IX - SPECIAL SUBSYSTEM DESIGN PROBLEMS
R. Toms, Chairman Introductory remarks
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
A. Hoffman - Jet Propulsion An Overview of Planetary Quaran-
Laboratory tine Considerations for Outer
Planet Probes
R. DeFrees - McDonnell-Douglas Planetary Quarantine Impacts on
Corporation Probe Design
R. Howell - Martin-Marietta Viking Planetary Quarantine
Corporation Procedures and Implementation
L. Thayne - Martin-Marietta Radiation Effects
Corporation
E. Divita - Jet Propulsion The Jupiter Electron Radiation
Laboratory Environment and its Effects on
State-of-the-Art Materials,
Piece-Parts and Components
R. McMordie - Martin-Marietta Thermal Control for Planetary
Corporation Probes
SESSION X - MISSION COST ESTIMATION
N. Vojvodich, Chairman Introductory Remarks
NASA Ames
J. Niehoff - Science Appli- Comparison of Probe Subsystem
cations, Inc. Costs with Spacecraft Subsystem
Costs
B. Ruhland - Jet Propulsion Cost Modeling Techniques for De-
Laboratory sign Maturity
F. Bradley - McDonnell-Doug- Systematic Approach to Design to
las Corporation Cost
SESSION XI - SUMMARY ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS
A. Seiff, Chairman Introductory Remarks
NASA Ames
Participants: J. Foster - NASA Ames
P. Tarver - NASA Headquarters
All Session Chairmen
-8-
SECTION B
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SESSION I - KEYNOTE ADDRESS, TUESDAY, MAY 21, 1974:
Introduction by Mr. A. Seiff of NASA Ames Research Center,
the General Chairman of this Workshop.
MR. SEIFF: Dr. Hans Mark is not going to be with us this
morning. He was required to be in a meeting at Boulder, Colorado
but is very ably represented by Si Syvertson.
I would just like to say a word or two to introduce Si even
though I think most of you know him. But for those of you who
don't, he speaks with some authority in the business of entry
technology for the reason that maybe ten or fifteen years ago he
was one of the group of people who were working on the early
lifting reentry bodies at Ames which were called M-l, M-2 and so
on. He has also been in the advance mission business because
for a period of time he was the Chief of the Mission Analysis
Division, stationed at Ames and reporting to NASA Headquarters.
So Si, would you please say a few words to the group here?
MR. SYVERTSON: I'm glad Al can remember when I used to
do useful things for a living. It's kind of surprising, and
gratifying, to see the size of the turnout to this Workshop.
We don't often get this many people in this kind of an area
anymore. We are very happy to see everybody here.
As Al indicated, Ames has been interested in entry tech-
nology for a long time, going back, I guess, more than twenty
years when Harvey Allen first got us started in the business.
In more recent years we have been more interested in applying
what we've learned rather than in the basic research areas. As
everybody here is aware, we are embarking on the Pioneer-Venus
program that will send multiple probes into Venus in a few years.
Later today, or tomorrow, you will hear some of the pre-
liminary results from Pioneer 10 with regard to defining the
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atmosphere on Jupiter. My understanding is that the preliminary
results indicate that the entry problem there is not quite so
severe as we once thought it was. I understand you are going to
be looking at probes for other missions to the outer planets.
I've looked over the schedule and it looks like a very
interesting meeting. I hope you enjoy it and I hope you find it
informative.
On behalf of Dr. Hans Mark and the rest of the Center, I
want to welcome you here to Ames. Thank you.
MR. SEIFF: This is probably the first meeting of a tech-
nical nature that I've ever attended that has a Keynote Address.
It is going to be made by a man who is parked illegally, I was
just informed a few minutes ago. This address is to be given
by Dan Herman who has been with the Headquarters NASA Office of
Space Sciences for many years. During that whole period, I have
felt that he has been a real sparkplug in keeping the Agency
moving towards the definition of its future programs. He has
been president of practically all, if not all, of the Pioneer-
Venus Science Steering Group meetings and playing an active role
in the implementation of that project as well. So, Dan is going
to talk to us a little bit about what he thinks the prospects
are for Outer Planet Probe Missions.
ORIGINAL u i, u
OF POOR QUALITY
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
MR. DANIEL HERMAN - NASA HEADQUARTERS
MR. HERMAN: I am not really going to give a keynote ad-
dress in the formal sense of the word. Rather,.what I thought.,
I would do is to tell you what the current status within NASA
is for an outer planets probe program.
I will begin with this first picture (Figure 1-1) of the
so-called official NASA mission model as of last October. These
are the missions Dr. Fletcher presented to the Congress in his
testimony in October and have been carried on the books as the
official NASA plan. Currently, this plan is in the process of
being changed because our thinking with respect to the outer
planet probe missions has changed. I will indicate the changes
from this so-called official NASA mission model of last October
to our current thinking.
Originally, the outer planet probe missions in our plan
were those stipulated by the Outer Planet Science Advisory Group,
headed by Jim Van Allen. The so-called "three to make two"
concept where in three opportunities dedicated Pioneer probe mis-
sions are launched to Saturn and Uranus, with the last one to
either Saturn, Uranus or Titan as a function of the success or
failure of the two predecessors. This strategy of the "October
plan" is shown on the second schedule (Figure 1-2).
In 1979, we would send a dedicated Uranus probe mission to
fly by Jupiter and be deflected to Uranus. The arrival at Uranus
would be 1984. Then, in the 1980 opportunity, we would send a
probe to Saturn directly and that probe would reach Saturn in 1984.
Then in 1981, we would launch a probe mission, the Saturn-Uranus
swing-by opportunity, which would reach Saturn in 1985 after both
earlier probes had encountered Saturn and Uranus. If both earlier
-12-
PLANETARY EXPLORATION PROGRAM (PL)
October 1973
Code Payload CY 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 Total
Do Approved Programs
PL-I Mariner Venus/Mercury I
PL-2 Pioneer Jupiter Flyby 0
PL-3 Helios 2
PL-4 Viking 75 2
PL-5 Mariner Jup/Sat 77 ) 2
Inner Planets
PL-6 Viking Orbiter/Lander 79 1 1
PL-7 Surface Sample Return 2 2
PL-8 Satellite Sample Return I 1 2
PL-9 Pioneer Venus 2 2
PL-O0 Inner PI. Follow-On 1 2 1 1 5
PL- 1 Venus Radar Mapper 2 2
PL-12 Venus Buoyant Station 2 2
PL-13 Mercury Orbiter 22
PL-14 Venus Large Lander 2 2
Outer Planets
PL- 15 Mariner Jup/Uranus Flyby 2 2
PL-16 Pioneer Jup/Uranus Flyby (Uranus 1
Probe)
PLI7 Pioneer Saturn Probe I I
PL-18 Pioneer Sat/Uranus Flyby (U Probe) 1I
PL-19 Mariner Jupiter Orbiter 2 2
PL-20 Pioneer Jupiter Probe 2 2
PL-21 Mariner Saturn Orbiter 2 2
PL22 Mariner Uranus/Nep Flyby 2 2
PL23 Jupiter Sat. Orb/Lander I 1 2
Comets & Asteroids
PL-24 Dual Comet Flyby I I
PL-25 Encke Slow Flyby 1
PL-26 Encke Rendezvous 2 2
PL-27 Halley Flyby 1 1
PL28 Asteroid Rendezvous 2 2
Total 1 1 2 2 2 2 5 2 7 0 3 4 5 5 2 0 2 2 2 49
Note: Approved and On-going
Launched Figure 1-1
PROBE MISSION STRATEGY
5/20/74
OCTO ER PLAN CY 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 69
79 PIO JUP/URANUS F.B. (U PROBE) L J -
11/79 2/81 7/84
80 PIO SATURN DIRECT -- L S
12/80 1/84 -.
81 PI0 SAT/URANUS F.B. (U PROBE) -- L S U--
12/81 1/85 11/83
C *RRENT PLkAN
79 MAR JUP/URANUS (U PROBE)" -- L J U--
10/79 7/81 11/86
80 PIO JUP ORB W/PROBE - J-
1-1/80 4/83
80 PIO SATUIN PROBE - L S--
12/80 1/84
82 PIO SATURN/TITA PROBE - L .T--
12/82 2/86'
Figure 1-2
probes were successful, this probe would then go into Titan. If
either the Saturn or Uranus probe was a failure, then this probe
would repeat either the Saturn or the Uranus mission.
The scenario had a couple of weaknesses in it, the major one
of which was exposed at the Titan workshop held here at Ames about
a year or so ago. The strong advice of that workshop, which we
have accepted, was we should not try to achieve commonality be-
tween a Titan probe and an outer planet high-atmosphere probe;
the reasons being that the science to be performed at Titan would
be different and, also, that the quarantine restraints to be im-
posed on a Titan probe would differ from the outer planets probe.
In this old plan (Figure 1-2) you don't see a Jupiter entry
because until the Pioneer 10 encounter our entry analysis of the
Jupiter probe mission, indicated that facilities would not be
available until about 1980 to test an entry probe to the Jupiter
entry heating conditions. Hence, we deferred a Jupiter entry
probe until the mid-1980's. That thinking has changed and that
is going to be a major issue of this workshop.
Let me go to thisnext schedule (Figure 1-3), and show you our
current thinking. For the October mission model we were given a
fiscal constraint by the Administrator to formulate all of the
new programs we hoped to implement for the next five years. The
original mission model was in consonance with that fiscal con-
straint. However, late last year several things happened, one
of which was a forecast overrun in the Viking program.
Since our overall budget does not increase, funds for plan-
ning for new missions is from the same funding that has to ac-
commodate overruns. We, therefore, had to alter our thinking
and decide which missions we wanted to do as scheduled and which
missions would have to be deferred. Since the outer planet probe
missions could be done almost in any year - the opportunities to
the outer planets occur in about a twelve-or fifteen-month period
- these were more easily deferrable than some of our other missions.
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PLANETARY EXPLORATION PROGRAMS April 1974
PAYLOAD CY 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 818283 84 8586 87 88 9 90-91
NPPROVED PROGPRAMS
MARINER VENUS/MERCURY 1
PIONEER JUPITER FLYBY 1
HELIOS 1 1
VIKING '75 2
MARINER JUP/SAT '77 2
NE:ER PLANETS
VIKING ORBITER/LANDER 1
VIKING ORBITER/LANDER (W/ROVER) 1
SURFACE SAMPLE RETURN 2
SATELLITE SAMPLE RETURN 1
PIONEER VENUS 2
INNER PLANET FOLLOW-ON 1 2 1 1
VENUS RADAR MAPPER 2
VENUS BUOYANT STATION 2
MERCURY ORBITER 2
VENUS LARGE LANDER 2'
OUTER PLANETS
tMRINER JUP/URANUS FLYBY (U PROBE) 2
PIONEER JUPITER ORBITER (ESRO) 1
PIONEER SATURN PROBE 2
PIONEER SATURN/TITAN PROBE 2
MARINER JUPITER ORBITER 2
PIONEER JUPITER PROBE 2
MARINER SATURN ORBITER 2
MARINER URANUS/NEPTUNE FLYBY 2
JUPITER SATELLITE ORB/LANDER 1
:O?ETS AND ASTEROIDS
ENCKE SLOW FLYBY 1
ENCKE RENDEZVOUS 2
HALLEY FLYBY 1
ASTEROID RENDEZVOUS 2
Figure 1-3
Consequently, when we formulated that mission model, the
dedicated Pioneer outer planet probe missions were deferred. As
I indicated before, our thinking changed about commonality between
an outer planet entry probe and the Titan entry probe and, also with
Pioneer 10 encounter andArv Kliore's data about the possibility that
the probe design for Saturn and Uranus would also have Jupiter capa-
bility. Since ephemeris uncertainty of Jupiter has been decreased
which allows a shallow entry angle, and if the atmosphere is more
toward the so-called'Warm expanded"or"nominal"atmosphere, it may
be possible to enter Jupiter with the same entry technology that
we will use for Saturn and Uranus.
So, for several reasons, our thinking has changed. We have
given up the dedicated Pioneer-Uranus entry probe. Instead, our
current thinking is to incorporate a Uranus probe in a Mariner
Jupiter-Uranus mission which we want to launch in 1979. As far as
a Jupiter entry probe is concerned, we are discussing a cooperative
program with ESRO at the present time, using Pioneer H to do an
orbiter mission in the 1980 opportunity and we are going to dis-
cuss the possibility and the advisability of incorporating a Jupiter
entry probe in that mission.
Our dedicated Pioneer-Saturn probes are still intact. That
thinking has not changed but now you see Pioneer-Saturn-Titan
probes. These would be a different kind of a probe. They would
be dedicated Titan entry missions. The Pioneer-Jupiter probes
is still kept on the books at the old date in case we cannot in-
corporate the probe into the Pioneer Jupiter orbiter mission with
ESRO.
These are some concepts and some of the things that we are
considering. The only way the concept of a probe on the MJU
flyby is feasible is to first aim the spacecraft so that it would
impact Uranus and then release the probe. The probe then need
not have an attitude control system or delta-V propulsion, and
after the probe is released, the spacecraft is deflected to achieve
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the flyby. This mode permits use of a simple, "dumb," probe that
can be developed within reasonable cost and weight constraints.
However, the spacecraft deflection mode requires a new NASA pol-
icy position on the quarantine requirements for outer planet entry
probes. This is being considered by the Space Science Board.
This issue must be addressed since this is the only practical
mode to incorporate a probe on a Mariner spacecraft to Uranus.
Figure 1-4 presents a concept of a dedicated Pioneer probe
mission into Saturn. Again, the concept for probe release would
be the same. The spacecraft, of course, serves as a communica-
tions relay for the probe during the entry of the probe into the
atmosphere. One of the things that is being studied is the fea-
sibility of designing one probe system which can be completely
common, including science for both Saturn and Uranus.
A cooperative Jupiter mission with ESRO that I mentioned,
and the possibility of a probe in that is shown here on Figure
1-5. The probe would be released before orbit capture and the
spacecraft would serve as a relay for the probe during entry.
Then the spacecraft would be captured and would achieve a highly
elliptical orbit about the planet. The first formal meeting with
ESRO on this mission is here at Ames on June 17 and 18.
Now, let me tell you one announcement that I think will be
of interest to some people here. The Mariner Jupiter-Uranus
Science Group that has been meeting is coming up with a strong
position that an atmospheric entry probe will materially enhance
the value of that mission. On the basis of a meeting last week,
we at NASA decided that we would go out with an RFP to industry
for a Phase B Study in fiscal year 1976 for an entry probe that
can be used for Uranus, Saturn and, if possible, Jupiter. The
RFP will be entitled, "Outer Planet Probes." The RFP will also
state that the first mission for this outer planet probe family
will be the MJU mission in 1979. Preceding the release of that
RFP, Dr. Rasool is going to form a small science group to evaluate
-18-
Figure 1-4 Pioneer Saturn Probe Mission
Figure 1-5 Pioneer Jupiter Orbiter with Probe
the payload that should be incorporated in the probe and this
will serve as a guideline for the Phase B contractors.
Our current thinking is that this RFP, which would be com-
petitive, would be released about July of next year and the pro-
curement procedure would be similar to Pioneer-Venus. It would
be open competition with two contractors selected to conduct a
competitive Phase B and only the winners of the Phase B allowed
to compete for the execution phase.
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SECTION C
SESSION XI - SUMMARY ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
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SESSION XI - SUMMARY ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION
MR. SEIFF: We plan for the next two hours to try. to sum ,up
what has happened here during the two-and-a-half days of. meetings.
In view of Dan Herman's announcement at the outset that the plan-
ning for Uranus probe missions was becoming more firm in the sense
that Phase B studies are to be undertaken, the panelists are going
to each put a special emphasis on the feasibility of the Uranus
mission and to comment on problems that they see remaining; things
that should be done to solve those problems and to bring.the tech-
nology up to the state where it is ready. If, indeed, it is not
now ready, as I think it is in many of the sub areas.
We are also going to try to limit ourselves to something
like five minutes each in the opening remarks on each subject
area so that we can allow some time for interchange between the
panel and the audience after we make the rounds. I think I pre-
fer to let the panel's statements be uninterrupted in the sense
of going from subject to subject until we complete all summaries.
At that point in time, however, we are going to declare open
house and we are going to receive comments from you. ..Or, if.you
would like to augment something that a panelist has said, or
agree with something, or disagree with something he has said or
raise questions, any of those things will be in order.
The order of the panel chairmen speaking will be the same
as that used in the original program, with the exception that Larry
Colin will speak for Ichtiaque Rasool who had to leave. We will
proceed on through the sequence, and we will close with remarks
from John Foster and Paul Tarver, representing Ames management
in the probe area and Headquarters NASA management respectively.
-23-
DR. LARRY COLIN: In case anybody is confused, I was not a
member of the panel. All the panel members from the first ses-
sion, Science Rationale and Objectives, left early and I happened
to be walking down the hall and they asked me to summarize what
they said. Since I didn't listen to all of them, I will make
some comments of my own as well.
The point that they wanted me to stress was that exploration of
the outer planets and their satellites by in-situ measurements is
absolutely required if the major questions about the outer solar
system are going to be answered. This is not to say that orbiter
and flyby remote sensing isn't important. Certainly, they are im-
portant from the point of view of helping to understand some of the
ground-based observations which have been collected over many, many
years now. But there is no question that in-situ probing will be
necessary in the long run.
Interest ranges over a wide spectrum of missions from simple
missions of the kind that were mentioned consisting of simple tem-
perature, pressure, and accelerometer instruments, plus the compara-
tive atmospheric structure experiment (a payload which may be of
the order of two kilograms), up to a full-blown entry probe mission
of the order of the Pioneer Venus large probe mission, which con-
tains about thirty kilograms of scientific payload weight.
The panel was very much interested in the proposal put forward
by John Wolfe of a Pioneer-Jupiter orbiter dropping off a small
probe which would be capable of carrying about ten kilograms of
science. Ten kilograms fits nicely within the two-to-thirty spec-
trum that I mentioned. The experiments that are on the Pioneer-
Venus large probe are, in fact, those which are in the primary
payload including options mentioned at these meetings. Included are:
(1) the atmospheric structure experiment (temperature, pressure, ac-
celeration and, hence, density, of course, which results from these),
-24-
(2) for measuring the composition of atmospheres, both the mass
spectrometer and gas chromatograph and their combinations, of
course, are of interest, (3) for studying the cloud structure, the
cloud particle size spectrometer and nephelometer, and finally,
(4) for studies of thermal balance of the planets, devices like net
solar flux radiometers and net IR flux radiometers would be very
important in outer planet missions.
The question arose about payload commonality for Uranus, Saturn
and Jupiter missions. The panel members definitely feel that trade-
off studies are required immediately to determine the question of
whether such commonality is desirable. Certainly, commonality
sounds good, but it should be looked at from a scientific point of
view for each of these outer planets and their satellites. As I
understand it, NASA Headquarters has taken up this suggestion of a
trade-off study and one will be set up this summer. Don Hunten will
be organizing the summer study.
The panel wishes also, to endorse for outer planet science the
basic approach which has been used for Pioneer Venus. That is,
complete iteration and reiteration of the science objectives and
instrumentation and spacecraft capabilities so that one can opti-
mize and balance the scientific payload against the spacecraft de-
sign with the viewpoint of keeping as low a cost approach as possible.
John Lewis made a special plea in the area of composition meas-
urements. Chemical analyses of the planets appears to be a relatively
easy thing to do with the kind of instruments that are at hand today.
The measurements of isotopes, clearly of importance in solar evolu-
tion theory, is the thing which is most difficult to do. The idea
of a separate gas chromatograph and a separate mass spectrometer is
certainly a desirable thing to have. The question of combining them,
a la Viking, as a single instrument is something that he endorses
for continued development.
Along this line, I would like to urge NASA Headquarters that they
generally maintain a strong SR&T program for advance development of
long lead time instruments.
-25-
Don Hunten cautioned that we should not overlook the import-
ance of the upper atmospheres and ionospheres of the outer planets.
After all, we do fly through them getting into the lower atmosphere,
if for no other reason. But they are important for their own sake,
and we have a ready collection of in-situ measurement devices:
neutron and ion mass spectrometers, retarding potential analyzers,
electron temperature probes, and airglow and dayglow devices,
which would be very useful on outer planet missions.
With regard to Uranus, John Lewis stressed that it is the logi-
cal first choice; and the panel also feels it is the logical first
choice for outer planet entry missions. They caution that the
Pioneer 10 thermal results from the occultation experiment, which
appear helpful from system design, are quite contradictory with re-
gard to all other measurements that have ever been collected across
the spectrum. They feel that all the conflict that has arisen makes
it impossible to use the Pioneer 10 results as a basis for space-
craft entry designs in the future. Those results have to be under-
stood if they are correct.
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MR. BYRON SWENSON: The Mission and Spacecraft Design
Constraints panel had roughly ten major points that they would
like to make. They divide themselves roughly equally into com-
ments regarding navigation and comments regarding systems.
With emphasis on Uranus, the first and probably the foremost
is a plea for an improved ephemeris of Uranus. We estimated
that we could obtain this for a very modest expenditure; I believe
about $250,000. It seems that there is a -real requirement that
something be done along this line.
The second point also deals with navigation relative to
Uranus. We have seen that optical measurements were required
because of the ephemeric uncertainty of Uranus, but there is a
question relative to the real-time processing of the optical
measurements when you have something like a five-hour light time
from Uranus to the Earth. And the software that goes into pro-
cessing that type of data and the real value of that data is still
in question.
The next major point is a systems oriented point relative
to Uranus. There is concern by several members of the panel as to
the system interactions and implementation of deploying a spinning
probe off a 3-axis stabilized Mariner bus. The problems do not
seem entirely insurmountable, but there are a lot of things that
have not been investigated: tip-off errors, the implementation
of the deployment; whether we should have a spin table; whether we
should go to the difficulty of putting a spin table on the space-
craft; and so on.
The final systems oriented point relative to Uranus was
the question of how much commonality should be carried in the
probe design. Previously in the Saturn-Uranus probe studies where
we deployed it off the Pioneer spacecraft, we did find that we coul,
employ a great deal of commonality. But now introducing the Marinex
into this and not only do we require commonality between the plan-
ets, but we must now require commonality between spacecraft. This
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implies some penalties associated with the probe when flown
on a Mariner.
For example, the frequency that was chosen for the Pioneer
was 400 megahertz and I believe that 800 megahertz would be a
more reasonable center frequency if you were flying off a 3-axis
stabilized machine which had a highly directional antenna.
And, of course, a change in the communication system cas-
cades itself right on through the system, and I am sure there
are penalties here that we have not completely understood.
So we have the whole question of how much commonality is
desirable and cost-effective.
Moving on to the Saturn and Titan missions, which were to be
Pioneer launched, we saw that the capability to obtain a Titan
intercept and the subsequent Titan occultation was indeed uncer-
tain with the V-slit navigational sensor.
However, the point was raised that the tests that TRW has
made on the V-slit have indicated a greater accuracy than was used
in the calculations that resulted in the previous conclusion.
So it appears that if we are going to fly a Titan mission using
a Pioneer spacecraft, there is more work to be done on the V-slit
sensor to verify this greater accuracy.
For Jupiter probes, one of the major questions which nas not
been addressed sufficiently in the conference is the radiation harden-
ing of the Jupiter probe. The probe does have to get in close to the
planet by definition and it will encounter a great number of protons if
the current models are correct. Some more light should be shed on
this question with the Pioneer XI passage, which will give us much
closer passage and a much better model of the proton belt.
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A question was raised relative to pre-entry science data
particularly at Jupiter. It was felt that the scientists - and
I believe Don Hunten mentioned this - would eventually request
pre-entry science. A dramatic impact is noted when you require
pre-entry communications from the probe. I just want to high-
light this because if you do put on pre-entry science you are
going to really change the probe design.
And finally, there was a feeling that we should re-examine
the depolyment strategy for all these missions. They appeared
to be common but there were slight differences. Nearly everyone
is using deployment at 27 days prior to encounter. However, we
saw some numbers slightly different from that, and it was felt
that these factors do have some fairly sizable impact upon the
systems, and we should, if we are going to have a common probe,
standardize some of those factors.
MR. SEIFF: If I may exercise the Chairman's prerogative
here, I would like to ask you one question. The suggestion that
was made by Tom Crpft, when coupled with the problem that was
described by Donn Kirk, namely, the need for accurate initial
conditions for reconstruction of the atmosphere - these seemed
to couple together. He is proposing that the relative velocity
between the probe and the bus be accurately determined prior
to entry - after separation but prior to entry - and that the
bus trajectory be accurately documented from its perturbation
in flying by the planets which, coupled together, leads to a
very accurate information, presumably, on the initial conditions
for entry.
MR. SWENSON: I can't really comment on that. The only
thing I can say is that the Mariner with its full optical sys-
tems will be able to deliver the probe to a much smaller entry
angle corridor than.the Pioneer can, for example, at Saturn.
And this, too, of course has impact on the probe design and the
question of how much commonality should be provided and the qual-
ity of the science you will get at Saturn versus Uranus.
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MR. SEIFF: Tom Canning is next, to speak on the subject
of the probe design.
MR. CANNING: Most of the things that I will comment on
are concerned with probe system designs. There will be others
talking about the sub-systems of probes, and I will try not to
spend too much of my time on them.
With regard to the draft "10-Bar Probe" book that was
sent out with invitations to this meeting, one point was empha-
sized through the study DYNATREND did with and for us, but may
not have been amplified .on adequately here; and that is in that
book and in discussions during the last three days we see very
different system designs to do the expected missions at Saturn
and Uranus. This serves a purpose, namely, it tells you that
either there is no single, unique design that will do the job, or
these differences might imply that somebody is off on the wrong
track in his design.
One of these designs was done essentially on the basis,
"no-holds barred, re-package your payload, do everything neces-
sary to design the system for the mission." The other approach
which received a lot of attention was, "Here are a bunch of
boxes and designed systems from a similar investigation, do this
outer planet mission with them modified as little as possible."
There were other minor differences in ground rules, but that
really was the driver to produce the very different designs pre-
sented.
During this meeting all of the designs we have discussed
in detail for the Saturn-Uranus entry and descent were unstaged
designs, that is, they did not have a parachute stage to delay
the descent at high altitude. One of the panel members urged,
and I repeate his urging, that we really must not consider this
to be a closed subject. We have to expect continuing evaluation
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by the engineering and scientific communities on the impact
and value of obtaining high altitude measurements. And an input
to these trades would be the designs for staging via parachute-
type systems.
Along the same lines of the continuing interest and in-
fluence from the scientific community, we clearly should keep
a very active participation of a nucleus of scientists. During
the formative phases of the project, we would like to know as ac-
curately as possible what the scientific requirements are going
to be when the mission is approved for execution. At that point,
or shortly thereafter, we would like to have some way of final-
izing on these science requirements, turning the scientists off,
if you will, to let us get on with the system design in accordance
with the requirements as have been established. And this always
presents a problem.
In the middle of that problem is the establishment of
priorities, or of principal goals in the case of a probe mission
going to any of these planets. This usually manifests itself in
the competition for weight, dollars, data, or any other measurable
quality, between the probe that goes into the planet and the
spacecraft which flies by. I think that this is a question which
should be settled by the concensus of the scientists ahead of time;
i.e. establish these priorities, and then stick to them. I can
see grave difficulties and costly perturbations to a program if
those priorities are not carefully settled in advance.
Another comment that came from this discussion was concerned
with schedules and that we should do our best to pace the program
very carefully in accordance with what we are able to do. That is,
to base the next program, or perhaps ,the next two programs, on
what we are quite confident we can start out to do right now.
Perhaps, even restrict these programs to things that we know damn
well we can do. The danger of that approach, however, is that we
would be neglecting the long-distant program; obviously, in this
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case a Jupiter probe mission which presents a major step in
difficulty from the other outer planets.
We certainly would like to consider the possibility of
what one might call a revolutionary advance for that program,
even though we don't demand or we would not even intend to use
such advances for earlier programs unless they came along very
rapidly. An example of this advance could be the continued
development and availability of a characterized reflecting
heat shield.
Another point should be made: several speakers indicated
that Jupiter entry is now so much easier with the improved eph-
emeris, improved navigation and so on based partly on Pioneer 10
data. This discussion was very optimistic. On the other hand,
not sufficiently emphasized is the point that the heat shield
of this Jupiter-entry vehicle does not change much. Even with
shallow entry, the probe is going at 50 kilometers per second
and has to be slowed. The heat shield will remain to be the
design driver.
My group then discussed the philosophy of the control of
system design for long term missions, and this is in the area of
the reliability of the hardware produced. We typically charac-
terized the hardware that we have used, the subsystems and the
total systems, by reliability numbers. Analyses should be con-
tinued with regard to 'the cost-effective approach to reliability
for long-term missions: redundancy of equipment vs. high re-
liability demonstration projects; reliability analyses, fail-
ure analyses, and the examination of the consequences of failures.
The JPL approach to this subject should be examined since it ap-
parently works well as demonstrated by the Mariner-Venus-Mercury;
Mariner X mission. There were equipment failures and yet the
mission was a fantastic success.
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MR. SEIFF: The critical areas of heating estimation and
heat protection will be covered next and Dr. Walter Olstad will
address the first of those subjects.
DR. WALTER OLSTAD: From the point of view of entry aero-
dynamics and heating, being asked to focus on Uranus really
doesn't restrict me at all because we know so little about
Uranus. What we know about the atmosphere is that there is some
hydrogen in it and there is some methane in it. And if we de-
sign for what is now considered the worst case, the entry in
terms of heating rate is about as severe as the nominal Jupiter
entry. Thus, if Uranus rather than Saturn or Jupiter is chosen
as the first target for an outer planet probe, the problem of
entry heating is not greatly simplified.
And that brings up the first point. We need a good handle
on the range of possible atmospheres. We'll let someone else
worry about what the probabilities are but let us know what the
range of possible atmospheres are and we'll exercise our pre-
dictions over that range. Then the decision makers can work
with those numbers as they will.
An interesting feature about outer planet probe missions is
that we are going to have to rely much more heavily on analytical
and computational predictions without backup experimental veri-
fication than ever before unless we undertake a fight experiment
which could be a very costly thing. So we need to assess the
risks, and we must assess them quite carefully. This is some-
thing we should get on with right away.
Now, let's look at our ability to predict heat transfer for
probes entering the atmospheres of the outer planets. Most of
the analyses have been confined to the stagnation region. They
are quite sophisticated and we feel quite confident we can come
up with a conservative number and one that is not so far out of
the ball park that you are really compromising probe design.
However, we have no real experimental verification. Any verifi-
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cation we have is a partial verification under conditions much
less severe than required.
As we go away from the stagnation point on the probe, things
get worse. At the present time, we have just a few analyses, a
few analytic tools available and there are some serious deficien-
cies in these tools. These deficiencies have to do with things
like predicting transition, determining turbulent heat transfer
and determining the chemical state of the ablation products. These
deficiencies are going to remain because the only way we can get
at them is experimentally under the same conditions the probe will
experience. It is not easy to extrapolate from experimental ex-
perience when you are talking about transition and turbulence.
What we do now is take a lot of data and fit curves through it.
The curves are not based on any physical reasoning so when you
try to extrapolate a long distance from the original data base you
can be badly misled. There are plenty of examples of just this sort
of improper extrapolation throughout our short history of entry
vehicle design.
So we are going to be faced with considerable uncertainty,
and it is important that we try and quantify the uncertainty so
that a proper assessment of risk can be made. Furthermore, we
need to improve the analyses in the down-stream region as much as
we possibly can. We are working at that right now.
If we go farther back on the probe to the probe base area,
again we depend almost entirely on experimental numbers for base
heating. That is not anything that is really going to make or
break a mission, but there is a lot of area back there and the
heat shield weight is significant. So, again, I think we are
faced with an uncertainty and it is important that we try and
quantify that uncertainty.
In general with regard to heating, if we find after trying
to quantify uncertainties, that the risk looks pretty large, it
might make sense to try and get some experimental data. The only
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way I know to do it now is a flight experiment, and that could be
very costly. So the risk-cost trade off is a very serious one.
It is interesting that, for the Viking mission, where the
heating is not very severe and where ground facilities are adequate,
the Viking people are putting a 1.5 factor on all of their heating
predictions. If we start putting a 1.5 factor on heating predic-
tions for the outer planets, we are liable to put ourselves out of
business. And yet, the uncertainties are probably going to be a
lot greater for these outer planets than for Mars. So, again, it
is extremely important that we try to quantify these uncertainties.
In addition, we need to perform a number of parametric studies
over the range of possible atmospheres. All we have looked at
are a small family of blunt cones and Apollo shapes and the so-
called model atmospheres. Furthermore, most of these parametric
studies were performed some time ago. Now our prediction methods,
while still far from adequate, are much improved. Perhaps through
proper studies we can identify a better configuration.
With regard to aerodynamics, stability, of course, is an im-
portant problem. We want to know what orientation the probe is in
at all times. We feel quite confident that we can guarantee a
stable design although there are some problems having to do with
large blowing rates, axisymmetric ablation, things of that sort,
but they don't seem to be particularly serious. They are prob-
lems we are going to have to work out, but will not require any
unusual effort.
With regard to performance, the Viking people say that they
would like to know their aerodynamic coefficient within five per-
cent in order to get good information on reconstruction of the
atmosphere from accelerometer data. Here, again, I think with
some work, with some studies in facilities that we already have,
complemented by some analytical work, we can probably achieve that
level of accuracy. 35
-35-
MR. SEIFF: Thank you. Inasmuch as there were very few
results given in the meeting on heating on the probes for Uranus,
I took the liberty of looking in some old publications that are
in my office to get some numbers and I saw in a study that Mike
Tauber did about four years ago a value of the mean heating rate
of six kilowatts per square centimeter for a body somewhat blunt-
er than the ones that are now being considered.
I think one of the McDonnell-Douglas people showed values
equivalent to twenty-four kilowatts per square centimeter. These
values are, by comparison with those that have been computed for
Jupiter entry, quite modest.
DR. OLSTAD: But if you look at the worst case, the radiative
heating rate goes up to fifty kW/cm 2 and that coincides with a
nominal Jupiter entry. Now unless we learn that the worst case
is highly improbable, we must design for it. Furthermore, we don't
really know that the current so-called worst case is the real worst
case.
MR. SEIFF: What does that worst case correspond to?
DR. OLSTAD: That is the cold dense atmosphere and a steep entry.
MR. SEIFF: What does that imply with respect to sixty per-
cent helium?
DR. OLSTAD: The cold dense atmosphere assumes 60 percent helium
by volume.
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DR. NACHTSHEIM: The heat protection group organized their
work into an assessment and recommendations and they also made an
observation focusing in on the question of Uranus.
As far as the assessment went, there were five points that
were made. The first one had to do with the characterization of
carbonaceous heatshield materials. The group felt that the
thermochemical prediction of graphite and carbonaceous material
was predictable. Particulate removal could be handled within the
range of our experience by applying a design factor. Two differ-
ent studies have used a design factor of 1.3.
The third point under the characterization of carbonaceous
material was that there was no agreed-upon particulate removal
mechanism.
The second main point made in the assessment was that the
silica-silica heatshield needs further characterization. However,
it was pointed out that there is a wealth of knowledge on the con-
vective performance of pyrex and quartz heatshields that dates
back to the 1960's and that many missile radomes are made out of
this material. This information should be looked into.
The third main point of the assessment was that all possible
mechanisms of ablation and intense heating are not known at this
time. They are undefined.
The fourth point under the assessment was that.present fa-
cility capabilities exist to verify heatshield designs, on a small
scale of course, for Venus and that such capabilities do not
exist for the outer planets. In other words, Venus is the limit
of our capabilities with existing facilities, at the present time.
The fifth and final assessment point was that our flight ex-
perience with radiation present is the Apollo experience.
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There were six recommendations. The first dealt with car-
bonaceous materials. Under this topic, one point is that we
should characterize carbonaceous materials at the highest heating
level possible. Second, we feel that we should increase the
laser power so that we can get larger heating areas. The third
point under this main topic of carbonaceous materials is that we
should combine the laser with an arc jet and get combined heat-
ing. The fourth point under carbonaceous materials would be that
we should exploit graphite performance, and we should start study-
ing the graphite-insulation system as a heatshield. Graphite
Uy itself is not a hIeatshield material. t L IeuiLes and insula-
tor. Another possibility is to look into the concept of a hot
bondline.
The second recommendation deals with silica-silica heat-
shields. There are several points under this. One is, develop-
ment should continue. Second, the silica material should be
exposed to the solar spectrum at high heating rates. There are
some facilities that utilize the sun with huge arrays of reflec-
tors to get heating levels on the order of six kilowatts per
square centimeter. The silica material should be exposed to
that environment. Third, another suggestion was to design a
material to reflect laser radiation. In other words, the tech-
nology is understood to reflect visible radiation. Since our
intense source of radiation is the laser, you should be able to
demonstrate reflection at 10.6 microns if you understand the
problem well enough.
The third recommendation had to do with a design philosophy.
It was the consensus that we should exert every effort to verify
heat shield design in ground-based facilities before flying a
mission. That is the recommended design philosophy.
-38-
The fourth recommendation had to deal with the engineering
flight experiments. We feel that these should be studied in
terms of earth entries, looking at the Langley proposal of a
rocket-launch experiment. .And in the 1980's, possibly a shuttle-
launched experiment should be.considered.
Also, in the way of an engineering experiment a planet
should be considered. What we suggest is to put the question
the other way around. If you could optimize the heatshield
design to go to Jupiter, do so; and then ask yourself what science
could you take along with that. This would be a feasibility study
to determine the engineering feasibility of sending a probe into
Jupiter. The Jupiter entry engineering experiment would be com-
parable in cost to earth entry experiments. This is not unlike
the Apollo experience. Before we put a man in the Apollo vehicle,
a whole class of vehicles were flown. This suggestion says, "Let's
build an engineering probe with modest science, demonstrate the
feasibility, then have the elaborate science." There, we would be
simulating everything in full scale. It is a serious suggestion.
The fifth recommendation is to continue development of the
giant planet arc, and this is being driven by a Jupiter 1984
launch.
The sixth recommendation is to accelerate development of the
giant planet arc, and this would be driven by the Uranus 1979
launch. At the present rate of development, it could not assist
that mission.
Then, finally, we made an observation that the life style of
the NASA entry technology personnel will change if the support of
the Uranus probe increases for the 1979 mission. The personnel
currently at' Langley and at Ames are only skeleton crews compared
to that which will be necessary to support the Uranus mission.
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MR. SEIFF: The subject of communications is equally cri-
tical because without communication all is for naught. So,
Terry, would you give us your appraisal of that situation?
MR. TERRY GRANT: I think the first item that can be derived
from our splinter meeting is that, by virtue of the absence of
discussion, we should conclude that there were no problems un-
covered in the Probe-to-Bus communications for a Pioneer Saturn-
Uranus mission with the present science requirements. In other
words, the baseline design with the ground rules that were ori-
ginally given does not appear to have any technology problems
associated with it. If new science requirements are added,
however, the baseline design will have to change. The first
requirement and the one which was discussed most was the require-
ment for pre-entry transmission. The consensus at the splinter
meeting was that the communications required for this could be
accommodated, but that it is impossible for us to assess at
this point the complexity of that communication system, or the
costs related to it, until we have some more details about this
requirement.
For instance, we really need to know what kind of frequency
stability is required for pre-entry transmission, since one of
the criteria for an experiment using pre-entry transmission is
to measure the electron density along the propagation path.
Also, we need to know what data rates are required. If it
is postulated that there is a small amount of science and it has
a low data rate, this pre-entry transmission might be relatively
easy to accommodate.
Of course, an important parameter of pre-entry transmission
is the time required. The transmission time and the data rate
are more related to total system requirements than to communications;
Once you build a transmitter it can provide transmission time in
direct proportion to the battery and thermal capacity of the probe.
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That was one point that we wanted to emphasize; that the pre-
entry transmission is also a systems'requirement and that it would
impact the systems design as much or more than communications.
Therefore, trade-off studies of the complete system are required
in order to come up withan efficient new baseline design.
The other point with regard to science requirements was that
there seemed to be an indication that additional scientific data
would be required during the descent portion of the mission. This,
again, would impact the baseline design for communications.
MR. SEIFF: What, specifically?
MR. GRANT: Well, I was thinking specifically of the interest
in the gas chromatograph and I can see that the data rate origin-
ally defined is likely to be considered sparse if the gas chro-
matograph is an added instrument.
I point this out because while the baseline design accommodates
the relay link at 44 bps, it doesn't do that with a large amount of
margin. Furthermore, the baseline design cannot be extended very
far to accommodate higher data rates by simply adding power, for
instance. It will require extensive re-design if we require much
higher data rates.
Going on to particular comments relative to the Uranus mis-
sion with a MJU probe, it is important to realize that the common-
ality considerations in this baseline design keeps it from being
optimized for a Uranus mission, particularly for a Uranus mission
with a Mariner-Jupiter-Uranus/probe.
First of all there is no turbulence proposed in the modelings
for the Uranus ionosphere, or atmosphere. Therefore, we might
achieve more efficient communications by going to a phase-modu-
lated signal rather than a frequency-modulated signal as we have
now.
-41-
Secondly, with the Mariner three-axis stabilized vehicle, the
use of the pointing antenna would make a higher carrier frequency
more optimum; I think Tom Canning or Byron Swenson pointed this out
earlier. We recognize that a commonality of communications design for
outer planet entry probes does make the design sub-optimum for a
Uranus mission.
Another point that came out perhaps more rapidly than we would
have liked was one that Kane Casani brought up in another presen-
tation. That is, there are conflicts between the flyby bus and
the probe priorities and they showed up in the papers that were
presented; particularly, in the paper that was presented by Paul
Parsons. There are a few interface problems that show up imme-
diately. One is that the optimum probe antenna beamwidth for the
presently-envisioned Mariner-Jupiter-Uranus trajectory is wider
than the probe beamwidth that we have in our baseline design.
This problem is not inherent in the Uranus mission but it is in-
herent in the considerations that were given to the Uranus tra-
jectory. I believe the trajectory was set up so that the bus
science would be free to operate without interference from probe
transmissions during the closest approach to the planet and,
therefore, the probe communication range and aspect angles were
non-optimum.
Another interface problem relates to the allowed storage on
the bus for probe data and the rate at which probe data can be
relayed in real-time to the Earth. If bus storage up to a million
bits and real-time transmission of 264 bps can be allowed, an
efficient code can be used for the relay link by taking advantage
of a complex decoder on the ground. However, if the storage and
transmission rates are appreciably less, decoding on-board the bus
may be required, resulting in more weight and cost for the probe
communications subsystem.
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The other factor that requires a technical decision on the
interface is whether or not some amount of antenna steering should
be provided for the relay receiving antenna on MJU.i The current
baseline for the MJU bus is to have a fix-mounted antenna. So
here again we have an interface where, obviously, from the bus
point of view a fixed antenna is desirable but if you look at the
overall mission priorities you might want to allow the antenna
some degree of mobility in order to optimize the relay link.
The last factor is one that goes along with what I said earlier,
that the baseline as it now stands does not have much margin for
increasing its capability. There is a possibility, however, that
within the next year further information on the turbulence models
for the outer planets, and also on the expected modem and coding
performance, could conceivably improve the link capability over
what we now use as our baseline. I think that there will be new
information incurred in the short run that will bear on the base-
line design for communications.
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MR. JOEL SPERANS: The Science Instruments Group, by con-
trast to what I have been hearing the last few minutes, tended
to take a very conservative point of view with regard to the
outer planets missions.
We concentrated on the baseline programs and I think at this
point we would have to say we will give Terry Grant very few com-
munications problems of the sort that he suggested.
The opinion in general was that we should concentrate on
doing one job and doing it well, and that the baseline job in
this case is the lower atmosphere. From that it followed that
we felt that by a combination of atmosphere-structure experi-
ments and a combination of mass spectrometer and gas chromato-
graphs, both of which are in a fairly high state of development
at this point, we could do a pretty effective job with the pay-
load capabilities that we have available to us today.
We did consider a number of specific problems in areas in
which more money and more effort should be put. In general,
they are relatively minor. Certainly more emphasis needs to be
put on the study of the problem in operating in a helium en-
vironment and pumping helium in the mass spectrometers. These
studies are being funded now, are going on and appear to be very
successful. The consensus was that this did not represent a
great problem in the long run.
An issue that has not had much emphasis put on it so far is
the question of survival and operation of some of the basic in-
struments after a shelf life of seven years. Most of our instru-
ments are ready to fly but they are not necessarily ready to fly
all the way to Uranus. It is going to take a while for us to be
sure that after seven years of sitting around on a spacecraft,
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or on the shelf, these things will operate in a way in which we
can understand them. Again, these aren't expensive tests but
they are tests which I think should be initiated very quickly.
I think the most significant outcome of our discussion was
the emphasis that we all place on the need to put more time and
more consideration into the application of the gas chromatograph
family of instruments into the outer-planet instrumentation.
We would like to enthusiastically endorse the removal of the
stigma of the so-called "ten-bar probe" that' we see -on a lot of
the documentation which seems to be coming out of Ames and a lot
of other places in the last few years. In the view of the instru-
ment people, this is not a ten-bar probe; it is an outer-planets
atmospheric probe and we-will get information as far down into
a planet's atmosphere as the spacecraft can provide us with com-
munications.
.There are one or two other minor tests that we would like
to see; that we would like to endorse: such as the trade-offs
between pressurizing the entire vessel or spacecraft versus try-
ing to build instruments that can operate in unpressurized at-
mospheres. These are things that should be undertaken and will
be undertaken in thenear future. I don't think they represent
large investments of money or taleht.
Other than that we felt that the basic instrumentation for
the lower-atmosphere science was in pretty good shape. Certainly
by the time the instruments fly on Pioneer-Venus we will be in
very good shape in those areas.
Because of its composition, this particular group, felt
that it did not really have the mandate to consider to any great
extent the apparent lack of emphasis to date on the middle at-
mosphere measurements. Larry Colin brought this out quite
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effectively in his opening remarks and I am sure Don Hunten too
would emphasize these to a great extent. We haven't .paid
sufficient attention to the problems of making measurements in
the so-called middle atmosphere.
One possibility for doing these in a low-cost way is the
shock-layer radiometer or some derivation of it. This instrument
is reasonably well-developed and reasonably inexpensive, but
again, we did not feel this to be within the province of our
particular group. Although we are not endorsing it strongly at
this point, we feel that a lot of serious thought should be given
to considering the shock layer radiometer as a fairly low-cost,
easily-accommodatible addition to the outer-planets payload.
I think that about concludes what we discussed.
MR. VOJVODICH: Did your instrument group address the opera-
tional question of penetrating heat shields and getting a resultant
clean sample of gas to analyze?
MR. SPERANS: Yes, we did. We discussed that at some length.
The reason I didn't mention it was that it did not appear to be
a problem. We discussed several options: several ways to do it.
In general, if we can poke a big enough hole through the heat-
shield and get a decent size sample to carry enough gas inside
to where the gas chromatograph and/or the mass spectrometer can
operate on it, the problem of working through the heatshield
doesn't appear to be formidable.
MR. SIEFF: Okay, thank you very much, Joel.
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MR. SEIFF: The next technical category is that of Special
Subsystem Design Problems which, in our meeting here, turned out
to be primarily sterilization and radiation effects. Ron Toms
of JPL will give us the summary group report.
MR. RONALD TOMS:, Well, in fact, the session we had did not
include a splinter group meeting. We had such a diversity of
topics that it didn't seem particularly appropriate to break
out into a splinter group.
The particular topic of planetary quarantine is one, of
course, that has been worked on a-great deal. We started off by
hearing the ground rules of the game that we are supposed to play.
Next we heard about the way in which we would do quarantine for
the outer planets, and the effects on probe design. Then we heard
a horror story of what Viking has to do to meet the kind of require-
ments imposed upon Viking. We don't know the cost of that; and
Viking is not, in fact, making an effort to keep the costs of
providing planetary quarantine as a separate, recognizable item.
I think we are a bit comforted though by the hope that heat
sterilization requirements of outer planet probes will be unneces-
sary. Those of you who were here on Tuesday morning and heard
Dan Herman's statement of his position on this heard that (for
the time being at any rate) in our mission designs, in our cost
estimates, and in the way we plan the mission we won't include
planetary quarantine, even though we will also do studies to find
out what it would cost and how it could be.implemented.
On the radiation environment and its effects, I think I could
summarize best by saying that the MJS spacecraft is solving the
problem for the MJU mission of what you do about flying past
Jupiter to carry a probe that would go on an MJU mission to Uranus.
A seven-year flight to Uranus, flying past Jupiter, would go by at
12Rj which is a fairly modest radiation dosage compared with some
of the cases that MJS itself is looking at (which go all the way
in as close as 5Rj and pass out to 8.5 or 9.) So as MJS solves the
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problem it will, in a way, get solved for Uranus. Nevertheless,
the probe itself has to be designed to meet the particular en-
vironment.
The Jupiter entry is another problem, and a probe that
goes into Jupiter will have to be designed to meet the environ-
ment which by then we hope will be much, much better known not
only from the later Pioneer data but from the MJS data itself.
The other two topics we tackled were battery life and
thermal design: battery life for a seven-year class of mission
and thermal design for the kind of conditions met in going out
to the outer planets. Some significant problems were stated,
and some adequate-looking solutions were discussed and given
quite a good airing here.
I have a couple of comments on the MJU mission itself.
It seems to me that it clearly is time to open up the probe-
science question and then to optimize the probe design for the
Mariner as a probe carrier. The other item is that I feel it
very important that you all recognize that the MJU performance
was not well reflected in the draft document that was sent out
to everybody. I don't want anyone to go out from here thinking
that MJU mission carrying a Uranus probe can only be flown off
the shuttle, so that won't be happening in 1979. The perform-
ance capability is available with the Titan, and corrections of
the document will be made before it is used in presentations
to the SSB, OMB and Congress.*
*(Updated information has been received and included in the
August, 1974 issue of the document "Atmospheric Entry Probes
for Outer Planet Exploration - A Technical Review and Summary"
Ed.)
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MR. SEIFF: Now that brings us to the cost session, which
was the most recent one this morning, and Nick Vojvodich will
summarize that.
MR. NICK S. VOJVODICH: Since the cost session was held
so recently, we changed the order around and our splinter group
actually met before the general meeting. We had about an hour
and all the cost session speakers sat around the table and dis-
sected program cost estimating from the standpoint of whether it
is a black art or whether it is a science or indeed a combination
of the two. I have some random thoughts that I jotted down dur-
ing the splinter session that might be of general interest.
One of the reasons we had so many questions at the end of
the open session presentations is that, as Steve Georgiev of
DYNATREND was saying, in technical areas some people always feel
uncomfortable; however, when it comes to cost, everybody is an
expert. That observation was reflected in both the nature and
extent of the comments and I hope we get into this cost area a
little bit more as the discussion that is to follow this round-
table summary develops.
One of the critical points that was made during our splinter
discussion by all speakers was that low cost methodology must tru-
ly be specified at the beginning of a program. That is a pro-
cedure must be set up to: monitor and to control the costs; re-
duce the required paper work; and minimize tests and development
costs wherever possible. Namely, achievement of low cost goals
is not obtainable by applying cosmetic changes to a "business
as usual" approach.
Another important point that was brought up is that inherent
in the traditional way of looking at the cost-weight sensitivity
of a subsystem namely, the cost of subsystems grow with weight -
is that the functional performance also usually goes up.
We are in a situation now, though, that if a system has
excess weight capability, and if, in fact, low cost and design-
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to-cost are constraints, fix the performance requirements and
take advantage of the weight contingency to realize the cost
savings. This is opposed to the historical approach of letting
somebody come in and say, "If I could only get two more bits of
data," or, "If I could only have one more sensor or more dynamic
range capability." Probe entry systems are not linear so that a
small change in one subsystem tends to perturb the system as a
whole, and you have an uncontrollable growth situation. As
somebody once said, "sometimes the spacecraft is growing so
fast that one wonders if the launch vehicle will have enough
boost capability to get it off the ground."
The question, of course, of inheritance was addressed dur-
ing all of the talks and it is at this point that we get a direct
interplay between technology and cost in some of the areas we
were discussing earlier. John Niehoff of Science Applications
Inc. emphasized that programs which push the frontier of tech-
nology run the risk of encountering potential problems that may
require a substantial number of additional tests and thereby
become susceptible to significant cost overruns. Therefore,
early attention to technology development and assessment and work-
ing the identified problems by doing the appropriate SR&T, can
significantly impact the program cost, schedule and technical
achievement.
Specifically, in the area of the heat shield, we recognize
that there is a quantifiable risk that one can handle by appli-
cation of a conservative margin of safety to the design. Regard-
ing this point, Fred Bradley from McDonnell-Douglas made the
observation based on his participation in a number of previous
successful flight programs ranging back to Gemini and Apollo,
"we've never really started a program where we have had all the
technology in hand. We have applied engineering judgment where
appropriate and used some of the available weight contingency
as a factor of safety and thereby eliminating the necessity of
having to go down to the last five percent or ten percent in
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either the prediction or the simulation of the heating environ-
ment." I am sure that we will get into a discussion of that
philosophy a little bit later.
From the standpoint of the track record of these costing
models that are used in project funding estimation, it appears
that by and large they generate predictions that have been
found to be within twenty-percent of the actual costs. That
was more or less an established goal of these cost models. But
if we are really trying to do business in a new way, one wonders
whether we should continue to use these cost-estimating models
which essentially are mirrors that reflect the past. So this
point was also brought up, that we've got to make sure that 
the
cost estimates are realistic, especially the early ones.
I want to close by emphasizing my last statement. That
statement coincides with a comment that Dan Herman previously
made at the end of the meeting; namely, the early cost estimates,
made in a phase zero, or pre-phase A, are most often the costs
that both the program manager and the contractor have to live
with. It is, therefore, extremely important that the cost people
interact with the technical people particularly during the forma-
tive stages of a program and get a good, solid, definition of
the system so that unexpected surprises are not encountered as
the program develops.
The key word here to categorize this aspect of the cost
situation is one of credibility. We have to develop a funding
estimate that is not only credible but one that is also realis-
tic in terms of existing technology.
That's the end of our cost-session wrap-up. It was a bit
disjointed but I feel that it accurately reflects our thoughts.
I am hoping that John Niehoff, Fred Bradley, and Bill Ruhland
will add to the follow-up discussion.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS -51-
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MR. SEIFF: Now we come to John Foster who is in the en-
viable position of not having heard the meeting, but being asked
to comment on its conclusions.
MR. JOHN FOSTER: I have two points I would like to make from
the Ames' management standpoint and, particularly, from the Pioneer
view point.
The first point is that we are interested in probe tech-
nology because we are interested in future probes. As you know,
we are in the middle of the Pioneer-Venus probe mission and Ames
and JPL are both looking into outer-planet probe missions. I would
like to clarify at least one point on that. There was a recent
article in one of the aerospace newsletters that said that NASA
plans to do all their outer planet probe missions using the Pion-
eer Venus spacecraft. It is not true, for a number of reasons.
First of all, the Pioneer-Venus probes are 100-bar, hot probes.
It is a different mission than the one that we are talking about,
which is around ten bars, and at different temperatures. I want
to assure all contractors that this is still an open ball game.
The last thing I would like to say is that it is my observa-
tion that the time is ripe to look forward to the outer-planet
probes, and particularly the Uranus probe. Certainly JPL and we,
and I am sure many other people, are very, vitally interested in
this coming mission.
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MR. PAUL TARVER: John Foster narrowed his comments to three
points and I am going to narrow mine to one. If I may, I'm going
to deviate a little bit from the chairman's admonition to stick to
Uranus.
This is something that has rather strong programmatic impli-
cations both as to mission sequence and our SR&T planning for the
whole series of outer-planet-probe missions.
You probably noticed in the mission model that Dan Herman
showed that the Jupiter-probe mission is scheduled for 1984. This
decision was made with the advice of the scientific community, not
because it ranked below the other planets in terms of science in-
terest but on the basis of when it was estimated that we'd have
the technological capability to do it. This estimate was based
on our prior estimates of the nominal or the less favorable Jupiter
atmosphere and ephemeris accuracy that was available.
Now, as a result of Pioneer 10, the improvement of the ephem-
eris and the possibility of a warm, expanded atmosphere, in some
respects opened a Pandora's box, which should be opened. There
is no complaint about that, but undoubtedly we are going to get
pressure to bring a Jupiter-probe mission off sooner. We need to
have some better facts, some better assessments than we have now as
to whether this is a practical thing to do.
The present structure of outer-planet-probe sequences, is based
on the development of a common Uranus and Saturn probe with the
first Uranus probe on the MJU, followed by a Saturn probe later.
The question now arises, can we do a Jupiter-probe mission using
Uranus/Saturn probe technology? If we can, then I am sure many people
will want to do a Jupiter-probe mission sooner.
So, I am making a plea for this: that we do what can be done to
get as much narrowing as possible of the uncertainty estimates in the
environmental parameters that are involved.
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Then, based on that, an assessment in as much depth as we can,
of the feasibility of doing a Jupiter-probe mission with Uranus-
probe technology. And deriving from that an assessment of the
risks involved if we attempt to do a Jupiter probe mission that
will employ common technology with the Uranus/Saturn probe.
Obviously, this has to wait for further verification from
Pioneer 11. But, when that is available, then I think we need
to do the studies to attempt to quantify insofar as we can the
risks that would be involved so that we can make the necessary
decisions whether it is feasible to move up the Jupiter-probe
mission.
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MR. SEIFF: Wewhave now reached the point where we are ready
to involve the audience in the discussion. We have gone around
the table and now is there anyone out on the floor who would like
to raise any questions?
MR. NICOLET: I would like to address this comment to Walter
Olstad about the heating between the worst case of Uranus entry
and the Jupiter nominal situation. If you were comparing the
maximum heating levels which occur at one point in time as you
enter, in fact I think that is comparable to the maximum heat
levels for the Jupiter entry, but that is only a fair compari-
son. If you look at the Saturn warm entry to explain the worst
flux, which is maybe only 5,000 kilowatts per centimeter square,
the requirements on the heatshield are almost as severe as for
the Uranus probe with its terrible helium content. The point is
that the time requirements are there and they are very important;
and for either Uranus atmosphere, the heatshields are only slightly
different and the requirements on the heatshield are a lot less
in the Jupiter case.
(NOTE: The following notation dictated by Mr. Nicolet after
the round table session).
**My comment was with regard to Walter Olstad's analogy between
the most severe Uranus entry heating condition and that for the
nominal Jupiter entry. The comparison was between the maximum
heating levels which would be encountered at one time on the
trajectories, that is the maximum heating levels for an entry.
That is not an entirely appropriate comparison as the time inte-
grated heating pulse more directly bears upon the required heat-
shield thickness. For example, the entry into the Saturn warm
atmosphere encountered a heat flux no higher than about 5 kilowatts
per centimeter square. However, the heatshield required for that
condition was almost as great as that for the Uranus cold dense
entry where the maximum heating levels were roughly 50 kilowatts
per centimeter square.*** (End of dictated notation.)
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DR. OLSTAD: There are two aspects to the problem, and one
is the total heat load. And certainly, for Uranus, it is con-
siderably less than what it would be for Jupiter and, as you say,
a shallow entry into the Saturn warm atmosphere is a severe case.
The other aspect is the heating rate and we don't know what is
going to happen to a heat shield when it is exposed to very large
heating rates. We aren't able to produce these conditions in
ground facilities at the present time, and until we have some
experience,heat shield behavior will remain a matter of particular
concern. So the heating rate is an important factor. Current
estimates of heat shield weights for outer planet probes are based
on the assumption that the heat shield materials will respond to
heat loads in the same way the Apollo heat shields did. This is
a very crucial assumption. If we find that heat shield materials
respond in a different way to large heating rates than to the smal-
ler rates of current experience then our estimates of heat shield
weights may be seriously in error.
MR. SEIFF: One comment that I think Nick made was very in-
teresting to me, and that was to point out the fact that on many
of the earlier missions that we have undertaken the uncertain-
ties have been very great.
When John Kennedy stood up in 1960, or whatever year it was,
and said, "We shall go to the moon," there was nobody around who
really knew that we were going to go to the moon.
So uncertainty in the projections of future missions is by
no means a new thing. And, really, what usually happens is that
people rise to the challenge. Once the planning is made definite,
people rise to the challenge and they do the job that has to be
done. I would fully expect the same thing to happen here.
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MR. SEIFF: Ron, you have some remarks?
MR. TOMS: I wanted to raise some points where I think the
Mariner mission has really not been well understood by this group.
In particular, the question of what you do about communications.
Now, in flying the Mariner spacecraft and being able to use a
body-fixed antenna with an extra five or six db gain, the first
thing that you can use the extra db for is to move from the dark-
side entry to the light-side entry, which is what the atmospheric
physicists particularly want. Flying around on the right side of
the planet instead of the left side also allows you to get a very
high escape velocity from the solar system, which is what the
inter-galactic investigators want.
The next candidate for using some of that db gain is to not
have to fly by at some specially-optimized flyby distance from
Uranus but to have flexibility, for example, from about 2 to 4 RU -
And the third thing you can use it for is a somewhat higher
data rate, if there is any need on the part of the scientists to
increase the data rate above the one that's now being looked at.
A fourth thing, then, is that of taking the probe data a
little earlier in order to get better pictures. That doesn't
mean to say that one can't take the data at the same time as
was previously planned, but if you have the extra db gain then
you can optimize a best combination of probe data and picture
data.
A fifth way to use that extra gain would be just to lower the
probe power by perhaps a factor of two. So there are all those
candidates.
Then, there is another way of increasing the db gain in this
data link and that is to move to a higher frequency. There is no
suggestion that Mariner wants a higher frequency. It doesn't
need it, but it would be another point of gain that one could make
-57-
to move up to 860 kHz or thereabouts.
Now, there were some remarks, too, that puzzled me about
whether or not we knew we could deploy a spinner from a three-
axis stabilized spacecraft. Certainly we can. There are a
couple of very good designs; both of them adequate and both of
them quite inexpensive and not costing us very much in weight.
There were some numbers in the handout (the Ten-Bar Probe docu-
ment) which talked about it costing 70 kg to be able to incor-
porate the probe on the Mariner. It must be a typographical
error. It only costs about 10.kg for all the additional things
that one would want to do to the spacecraft, including putting the
relay-link antenna and receiver on it, plus about 25kg of propel-
lant for the additional maneuver. The tip-off conditions have
been looked at and they are relatively modest. We are even look-
ing right now at a way of getting very, very close tracking of the
probe by simply turning the imaging system on to the probe as it
leaves the spacecraft. There we would get a very precise way of
monitoring the probe trajectory and extrapolating to accurate
entry conditions.
I want to take issue with something that Tom Canning said,
on a quite different topic. Tom, you said, I think, that you
wanted the Science Advisory Committee to be turned off and to have
a frozen position on priorities (when the program begins). That
would be a disaster for a mission of this kind.
MR. CANNING: I was just trying to avoid those major sur-
prises once one starts the program.
MR. TOMS: I think that is right, but you see there is always
the danger there that we either fly the wrong mission or we pro-
pose to fly the wrong mission and get turned down because it is
the wrong one.
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And I think that continuing the Science Advisory Committee
at full strength all the way through, is important. No more
messing around with AMDO's and all that sort of thing.
MR. CANNING: On the other hand, if you want to control costs,
as we are going to have to do, if we make major changes on the
demand of the system part way through a design, well, I don't
have to state the obvious.
MR. TOMS: No, but we must always be ready to.
MR. CANNING: Even that is expensive.
MR. JIM HYDE: I have a comment. There is a very specific
thing to be considered here. For some time Ames and a number of
industrial contractors have been studying the probe that we are
talking about. Out of that has come a reference payload capa-
bility. However, the interaction of these efforts with the sci-
ence community has not crystalized in the same way that the inter-
action is now crystalizing with the MJU Science Advisory Committee.
I think what has happened is we find ourselves looking at the
reference payload as being the payload for this mission. Let us
not do that. Let us wait until we get more specific inputs from
the science community.
I also heard some very interesting stories about different
mechanizations on the mass spectrometer, and it is, obviously, a
very interacting instrument with the probe system design. Let's
wait until we get the real inputs from the science community be-
fore we settle on the specific design of the Uranus probe. I
think we need this interaction and I think that we'd be playing
the wrong game not to let the scientific community give us their
best inputs and their druthers, and then let's look at the probe
design and see how best we can accommodate their desires. I
think that is what Toms is pushing here.
MR. VOJVODICH: I would like Larry to speak to that issue.
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DR. COLIN: I certainly endorse the idea of science groups
continually reviewing the situation. We have been pushing for
that sort of thing and it hasn't occurred yet. But I am hoping
that Ichtiaque Rasool will get it rolling. As far as the model
payload is concerned, it is in very fine shape. I personally
doubt that there are going to be significant modifications to it.
MR. SPERANS: I think there is a misunderstanding here.
I think that if anyone thinks that this payload was derived by
a few people from Ames and a few contractors sitting in a back
room and deciding what would fit into a probe, they are very
much mistaken. We have had interaction with the science commun-
ity right from the very start, dating back four or five years.
We've had science advisors representing a cross section of outer
planet scientists all along. And it has been their input which
has dictated the sort of payload that we are talking about today.
The implication that we have been working without this sort of
thing is in error. There is only one difference between this
and MJU and that is that as yet we don't have a formal Science
Steering Group. And the reason for that is programmatic and
I am sure that when the time comes, Headquarters will set one up.
MR. SEIFF: There is, for example, the benefit of the
entire process by which the Pioneer-Venus payload was defined,
which is the usual excruciating process by which people submit -
I think there were 180 proposals submitted to fly experiments on
Pioneer-Venus and it got narrowed down to what is now an instru-
ment count of thirty-three but there are actually fewer investi-
gators than that. So that what is being done here is all of this
experience is being factored forward. Now you do have to admit
the possibility that the selected payloads to the outer planets
will differ. But neither should what is being shown here be
regarded as something that was selected blindly without guidance.
-60-
MR. HYDE: I don't mean to imply that. I was specifi-
cally trying to get to this point: Let's not kid ourselves
and say that this reference design that we currently have is
The Design. We have to remain open at this time.
MR. SEIFF: Yes, I am quite sure that when it is execu-
ted, it has to be done that way, because nobody would sit still
for any other approach.
MR. SPERANS: Well at the same time we keep talking
about trying to do low-cost missions and sooner or later we
are going to have to face up to the fact that if you are going
to do anything remotely resembling a low-cost mission, you
have got to settle on some kind of a fundamental science ob-
jective and set out to do it, and stop trying to optimize it
right up to the point of launch. I think this is one thing
we are going to have to live with from now on.
MR. SEIFF: Howard has been trying very eagerly to get
in.
MR. MYERS: I would like to make a few comments about
upper-atmosphere versus lower-atmosphere instruments.
I wish to comment on the desire expressed by the at-
mospheric scientists for upper atmosphere measurements. Under
contract to ARC, we studied the accommodation of upper atmos-
phere instruments to Outer Planet probes. We found that the
installation of a simple instrument such as electrostatic probe
presented no difficulty. Its data could either be transmitted
in real time or stored for postblackout transmission. A neutral
or ion mass spectrometer can also be added. However, the pro-
blems of calibrating an upper atmosphere mass spectrometer
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described in Dr. Nier's paper are aggravated for the Outer
Planets by the high entry velocities. Therefore, in the Sci-
ence Instruments Caucus, the three mass spectrometrists recom-
mended that mass spectrometry be limited to the lower atmosphere.
The most promising additional instrument would be a second rf
transmitter; the use of two-frequency radio data in atmospheric
characterization was discussed yesterday by Dr. Croft.
A second aspect of obtaining upper atmosphere data de-
serves attention, that of measurement time. The total time
available for upper atmosphere measurements (that is, from
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onset of a sensible atmosphere at 10 GE to 10 GE) is 20 sec-
onds for a shallow Jupiter entry and up to 30 seconds for Saturn
and Uranus! Therefore, the intrinsic value of 30 seconds of
upper atmosphere data must be weighed against the increased com-
plexity imposed upon the probe design.
MR. SEIFF: There is one point that was brought up by
Phil Nachtsheim - that I would like to see aired a little bit
because I think it is so sensible that it probably would be
thrown out without consideration, and that is that since we
have problems trying to define the capability of heatshields
to survive Jupiter entry by any means here on Earth, one might
conceivably undertake something very modest, small in size,
carrying a minimum number of instruments and throw it off of
some vehicle that happens to be flying by there, such as Mariner-
Jupiter-Uranus. And not expect too damn much of it; just use it
for a learning experience and if we are estimating forty-eight
million dollars for this device, the question that comes into
my head is what could be done with five? What could be done with
five and how much of a leg up would it give us on this problem
to take the risk out of the really more capable mission? Now
I would like to hear other people's opinion about this. To me
it seems exceedingly sensible.
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MR. VIC PETERSON: Al, it is conceivable that with a sum
of money much less than five million dollars we could accelerate
the development of the Jupiter arc facility. This would enable
us to simulate the entry environment here on the ground and be
able to run the experiments over and.over again rather than
depend on a one-shot thing.
MR. SEIFF: That would be delightful if true, but I think
Howard Stine's report to us was not one really bubbling over with
optimism.
MR. PETERSON: He is trying to be realistic.
MR. SEIFF: He is trying to be realistic and what he is say-
ing is if we can marginally obtain the conditions of interest
and rather late in the game, and on a rather small sized specimen.
But if your speculation were true, Vic, I think it would be the
right way to go. Now I haven't seen evidence that it is correct.
That'.s the thing that's bothering me right now. It looks to me
like we can invest that same kind of money and still end up some-
what short of what we would like to have.
MR. PETERSON: It is true, though, Al, that you will always
get something out of a facility. With a probe you have a fifty-
fifty chance of getting nothing.
MR. SOMMER: If it fails you will get something; you will
know that your design was inadequate.
MR. SEIFF: Does anyone else wish to comment on that?
MR. SWENSON: If you forget the launch vehicle, your five
million dollars will be all right.
MR. SEIFF: Well, that is what I am saying, that this has to
be a piggyback experiment on some other mission.
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MR. NIEHOFF: I would like to give you a counterpoint to
your five million, based on the forty-eight million that we
talked about earlier. Thatwas for three flight articles. And
if you remove two of them, you are more like thirty-eight mil-
lion. If you knock off all the science and all the communica-
tion, which is not reasonable - presumably, even with a test
you want to get data back after you have entered to find out what
has happened - you would knock off another seventeen million, so
you are down to about twenty million.
Presumably, this thing would be smaller and there would be
some savings associated with that; but I still would have to be-
lieve that five million is probably unacceptably small.
In fact, I would propose that we start off with five and the
way this meeting is going, we will wind up at baseline payload
by just normal procedure.
MR. SEIFF: Yes, but you know how everybody's ruminations,
it doesn't mean we are going to have -
MR. NIEHOFF: Be careful, seventeen million dollars of that
is in communications and science.
MR. SEIFF: But you can shrink your communication system, too,
'because if you take out the major part of the science -
MR. VOJVODICH: That is his point.
MR. SEIFF: Is that your point?
MR. NIEHOFF: Yes.
MR. CARL HINRICHS: One should be a bit cautious in scaling
the costs of communications systems. Regardless of the data rate
or range, the link analyses must be performed, i.e., look angle
-64-
and range histories, error assignments and modulation/coding
investigations. Similarly the procurement cycle costs are
somewhat invariant, i.e., assessment of EMC and vibration/shock/
acceleration environments and the associated testing costs.
Even with the use of an "off-the-shelf" system, these same
steps (costs) must be traversed, although hopefully with some
of the steps deleted. It would be interesting to see Mr.
Niehoff's data broken into recurring and non-recurring costs
on a per link basis.
MR. SEIFF: I'm quite serious in being interested in that
idea. I don't know whether anyone else feels that way or not,
but to me it seems like a very real suggestion. Any other
comments or questions?
STAN LIPSON: Will you make a few remarks concerning
what role you see ESRO playing in the Pioneer-Jupiter orbiter
mission?
MR. SEIFF: Larry (Colin) can you answer that, or John
(Foster)?
MR. FOSTER: That is not an entry mission and I'd just
as soon defer that, unless Paul (Tarver) wants to answer.
That's a Headquarters problem at the moment.
MR. TARVER: This is one of several possible cooperative
missions under discussion with ESRO. Conceivably, one role ESRO
might play would be to convert the Pioneer H spacecraft into an
orbiter with science instruments supplied by both ESRO and NASA.
Again, this is just in the early stages of talking about it. But
we have a Pioneer H spacecraft, and if this were to be furnished
to ESRO, it could be converted into an orbiter. As to how a
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probe would be handled if there were a probe, this is totally
unresolved.
MR. SEIFF: Was there another question? I think we have
wound down. We have been going at it for three days and that
point has been reached where nobody can think of anything else
to say.
I would just like to say in closing that while I wasn't
instrumental in putting this meeting together, I really feel
gratified that it was held. I think that it had a number of
very positive effects. Some people have been calling for closer
interaction between scientists and design groups and we had that
here.
I have attended meetings on both sides of that fence, but
I have never been to a public meeting where there was really
quite as much exchange as I have seen here.
Another thing that I thought was extremely healthy was the
fact that we had contractors talking to each other. So we have
had contractors and we have had Headquarters people and Center
people and scientists all communicating with each other.
To me, the whole thing has been very much worthwhile. I
don't feel sorry at all that I spent three days sitting here,
and I hope the rest of you feel the same.
And with that, I will declare the meeting adjourned.
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